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THE TENANT AS CONSUMER: APPLYING




Theories of landlord liability to tenants have undergone radi-
cal changes in recent years. A lease, once viewed as a conveyance of
an estate in real property, is now considered a contract with im-
plied covenants.1 Similarly, the traditional tort immunity of land-
lords has been stripped away as a result of their new duties. 2
These fundamental changes have affected landlord obligations
in two major contexts: where a tenant has suffered injury either
due to a lack of adequate security in the leased premises or due to
a physical defect on the leased premises.3 The changes also raise
two sub-issues: whether a landlord's liability should extend to inju-
ries resulting from both patent and latent defects or from defects
that exist at the inception of the lease or arise during the term of
the lease.
Although most courts have eradicated common law immunity
for landlords in both contexts, and have applied the traditional
negligence standard of liability, few have adopted strict liability.4
* Visiting Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law. B.A., Rutgers University;
M.A. Ed., Seton Hall University; J.D., Stanford Law School.
I See Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence, or
Strict Liability?, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 19, 92-93.
2 See, e.g., Browder, The Taming of a Duty-The Tort Liability of Landlords, 81
MICH. L. REV. 99, 100-12 (1982) (discussing development of landlord's duty); Davis & De La
Torre, A Fresh Look at Premises Liability as Affected by the Warranty of Habitability, 59
WASH. L. REV. 141, 142-45 (1984) (discussing origin of tenant liability and expansion into
landlord liability); Love, supra note 1, at 91-111 (stating new developments in landlord
liability).
3 Most commentators focus on one of these contexts only. See, e.g., Recent Develop-
ment, Expanding the Scope of the Implied Warranty of Habitability: A Landlord's Duty
to Protect Tenants from Foreseeable Criminal Activity, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1493, 1510-11
(1980) (discussing issue overlaps).
" Several courts have addressed the question of whether to adopt strict liability for
landlords in one of these two contexts, but have declined to do so. See, e.g., Bidar v. Amfac,
Inc., 66 Haw. 547, 556-57, 669 P.2d 154, 161 (1983) (declined to adopt strict liability for
physical defects); Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 125 Ill. 2d 203, 228-29, 531 N.E.2d 1358,
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The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, has held landlords
strictly liable for injuries resulting from inadequate security of the
leased premises," while the California Supreme Court has held
landlords strictly liable for injuries resulting from physical defects
on leased premises.' Each court has utilized a different theory to
hold landlords strictly liable, but both have left unresolved the ex-
tent of the liability.
In Trentacost v. Brussel,7 the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that a landlord impliedly warrants to a tenant that the common
areas of the leased premises are safe and will remain safe through-
out the term of the tenancy.' If the tenant is injured by a third
party because of the landlord's failure to take reasonable security
measures, irrespective of whether the landlord has been notified of
the specific safety problem, the landlord may be held liable for
breach of an implied warranty.9 The court did not address the is-
sue of whether a landlord would be held strictly liable for a safety
problem of which she could not have been aware.
In Becker v. IRM Corp.,10 the California Supreme Court held
that a landlord "engaged in the business of leasing" may be strictly
liable for injuries sustained by a tenant resulting from a latent
physical defect in the premises that existed at the inception of the
lease." Although the court noted that it was not called upon to
decide whether landlords would be liable for patent defects as well,
it cited an earlier case, Luque v. McLean,2 which held that strict
liability covered patent as well as latent defects.'"
Ironically, however, in New Jersey, although the concept of
implied warranty of habitability originated in a case dealing with a
1370 (1988) (declined to adopt strict liability for defects in security).
6 See Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 228, 412 A.2d 436, 443 (1980); see also Kline v.
1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 486-88 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (arguably held
landlords strictly liable for defects in security, but application limited because of significant
facts: high level of security existing at inception of tenancy, decrease in security, and land-
lord's notice of previous crimes in building); infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing applications of Kline).
0 See Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 464, 698 P.2d 116, 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213,
219 (1985).
7 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980).
Id. at 228, 412 A.2d at 443.
SId.
10 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985).
" Id. at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
12 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
13 Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219; Luque, 8 Cal. 3d at
141-46, 501 P.2d at 1166-70, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 446-50.
[Vol. 64:527
TENANT AS CONSUMER
physical defect,14 a tenant who suffers injuries as a result of a
physical defect in the leased premises must prove negligence in or-
der to sustain an action for breach of the implied warranty of hab-
itability.15 And although California is in the forefront of imposing
strict liability for injuries resulting from a physical defect, a tenant
who suffers injuries as a result of an attack by a third party due to
a lack of adequate security in the common areas of the leased
premises must prove negligence to prevail.1 6
A review of the principles behind the extension of strict liabil-
ity to landlords for injuries sustained by tenants, whether in tort or
in contract, indicate that strict liability is warranted and that no
logical distinction can be drawn between a defect in security and a
defect in the physical environment of the leased premises. Like-
wise, the distinctions between patent and latent defects and be-
tween defects that occur at the inception of the lease and those
that occur during the term of the lease are untenable. Thus, it is
the thesis of this Article that, although the New Jersey and Cali-
fornia Supreme Courts have taken an important step forward in
delineating the proper scope of landlord responsibility for injuries
suffered by tenants, neither court has extended strict liability to
the extent necessary.
Part I of this Article discusses briefly the doctrines of the im-
plied warranty of habitability and strict liability in tort generally,
concentrating specifically on the development of these concepts in
New Jersey and in California. The Article will then focus on the
application of these theories of liability to both physical defects
and defects in security and the reasoning underlying these devel-
opments. Part II will suggest that the rationales supporting these
decisions compel the expansion of both contract and tort theories
of strict liability for injuries caused by any physical defect or de-
fect in security, whether patent or latent, in the leased premises
from inception and throughout the term of the lease. Further, it
will conclude that it is time for other jurisdictions to follow the
lead of California and New Jersey and to extend strict liability to
the landlord-tenant relationship. Finally, in Part III of the Article,
See Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 144-45, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (1970).
See, e.g., Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48, 56, 301 A.2d 463,
467 (no landlord liability for unknown latent defect not reasonably discoverable), aff'd, 63
N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973).
"' See O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp. Intercoast Mgmt., 75 Cal. App. 3d 798,
802-04, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487, 489-91 (1977).
1990]
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the developments in landlord liability in New York will be ana-
lyzed, and the applicability of a new framework for landlord liabil-
ity will be presented, based on the principles underlying
Trentacost and Becker, to other jurisdictions.
I. BACKGROUND-THE INCONSISTENT PAST
A. The Development of the Implied Warranty of Habitability
Sixteenth century England characterized a lease as a convey-
ance of property to which the doctrine of caveat emptor, more ap-
propriately termed "caveat lessee," applied.'17 Because the six-
teenth century tenant was an agrarian leaseholder whose leased
premises consisted mainly of unimproved land of relatively simple
design, discovery of defects prior to the inception of the lease was
most likely not difficult. In addition, defects that arose during the
term of the lease were probably of the kind which the tenant had
the skill and the financial resources to repair. Therefore, the doc-
trine of caveat lessee was presumably of little concern to those
tenants."i
As the urban tenant replaced the agrarian leaseholder, the rule
of caveat lessee became less suitable for the landlord-tenant rela-
tionship; in response, courts began to develop exceptions to the
rule. In the mid-nineteenth century, English courts held that when
a furnished house or apartment was leased for a short term, an
implied warranty of habitability existed. 9 The courts reasoned
that in such cases the premises were intended for immediate occu-
pancy, allowing no time for a tenant to inspect the premises ade-
quately or to put them in a habitable condition.2 ° In addition, it
was far more difficult for tenants to detect defects in a furnished
dwelling than in an unfurnished dwelling.2' Several American
courts have adopted this exception to the general rule of caveat
lessee; 22 others have adopted an alternative theory which recog-
" See Love, supra note 1, at 26-28.
'8 Id. at 28.
" See Sarson v. Roberts, 2 Q.B. 395, 398-99 (1895); Smith v. Marrable, 152 Eng. Rep.
693, 694 (Ex. 1843).
20 See Love, supra note 1, at 29.
21 Id.
22 See, e.g., Horton v. Marston, 352 Mass. 322, 324, 225 N.E.2d 311, 313 (1967) ("caveat
lessee" not applicable to injury incurred during short term rental of furnished cottage);
Minton v. Hardinger, 438 S.W.2d 3, 7 (Mo. 1968) (one month lease of furnished apartment
within exception to caveat lessee).
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nizes an implied warranty of merchantability covering furniture.23
Although these exceptions have been applied only in the limited
circumstances described above, landlords have been held strictly
liable for damages, even where the landlord did not have actual or
constructive notice of the defects.
In addition, as it became increasingly clear that the traditional
principles governing landlord-tenant law did not reflect the reali-
ties of modern urban society, courts reformulated the fundamental
rules governing landlord-tenant law. Courts redefined the relation-
ship as one of contract rather than one of property conveyance.24
In so doing, courts acknowledged that the common-law assumption
that a tenant could bargain for an express warranty of habitability
of fitness had become entirely unrealistic given the shortage of
low-cost housing and the disparity in bargaining power between
landlords and residential tenants in an urban society.2 5 Therefore,
courts began to imply a warranty of habitability into residential
leases, which commenced at the inception of the lease and contin-
ued throughout its duration.26
Traditionally, the implied warranty of habitability did not ap-
ply to criminal acts of third parties. The criminal act was consist-
ently held to be a superseding cause, against which one had no
duty to protect another unless there was a special relationship be-
tween the parties. 27 The relationship of landlord and tenant was
not considered to fit into this category. 2s
23 See, e.g., Fakhoury v. Manger, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 63-64, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473, 476-77
(1972) (landlord held liable for injury to tenant in furnished apartment for breach of im-
plied warranty of habitability); Toole v. Franklin Inv. Co., 158 Wash. 696, 700, 291 P. 1101,
1102-03 (1930) (same).
2' See Love, supra note 1, at 92-93.
15 See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.) (limited
leverage of modern tenant), cert. denied sub. nom. First Nat'l Realty Corp. v. Javins, 400
U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 625, 517 P.2d 1168, 1173, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704, 709 (1974) (housing shortages).
'6 See Davis & De La Torre, supra note 2, at 160-73; Mallor, The Implied Warranty of
Habitability and the "Non-Merchant" Landlord, 22 DuQ. L. REv. 637, 646-49 (1984); Note,
Recovery Under the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285, 285
(1982).
2 See Smith, The Landlord's Duty to Defend His Tenants Against Crimes on the
Premises, 4 WHIrTIER L. REV. 587, 592 (1982); Note, California Landlords' Duty to Protect
Tenants From Criminals, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 859, 860-61 (1983); Recent Development,
supra note 3, at 1503 (1980); Comment, The Landlord's Emerging Responsibility for Ten-
ant Security, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 275, 277-78 (1971).
28 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1966). The special relationships where
a duty to protect has been recognized include innkeeper-guest, common carrier-passenger,
business invitor-invitee, and custodian-ward. Id.
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Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.2 9 was
the first case to apply the warranty of habitability to defects in
security and to recognize a special relationship between the land-
lord and tenant.30 In Kline, the plaintiff was the victim of a crimi-
nal assault and robbery in the hallway of her apartment building, a
585-unit apartment complex in Washington D.C. 1 At the time the
plaintiff had moved into the complex, seven years before the as-
sault and robbery, there had been a doorman at the main entrance
and a clerk at the lobby desk, each on twenty-four hour duty, and
two garage attendants positioned so that they could observe the
remaining entrances.32 During the plaintiff's tenancy, the incidence
of crime in the building increased.3 3 Although the landlord was
aware of this increase, the doorman was removed, and the desk of
the lobby often was left unattended, as was one of the entrances. 4
At trial, the plaintiff testified that she originally had moved into
the building because she had been concerned about security and
had been impressed by the precautions taken at the main en-
trance.3 5 The district court held, as a matter of law, that the land-
lord had no duty to protect tenants from foreseeable criminal acts
by third parties, and entered judgment for the landlord.36
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit re-
versed,3 7 holding that such a duty does indeed exist on three differ-
ent grounds. First, the duty arises from the "logic of the situa-
tion."38 Second, the implied contract between a landlord and
tenant obliges the landlord to provide those protective measures
that are reasonably within her capacity. 9 Third, the court analo-
gized the landlord-tenant relationship to the innkeeper-guest and
landowner-invitee relationships. 40 The court noted that the reason
for imposing a duty on innkeepers to protect patrons from an as-
sault by a third party is that the ability of one of the parties to
29 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
30 Id. at 481-83.
31 Id. at 478-79.
32 Id. at 479.
33 Id.
34 Id.
'5 Id. at 479 n.1.
36 Id. at 478.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 483.




provide for her protection has been limited by her submission to
the control of the other.4' The court reasoned that the tenant's
ability to protect herself in the common areas of the premises is
similarly limited and, therefore, a duty arises on the part of the
landlord. 2
Most jurisdictions have declined to adopt the reasoning of
Kline and have limited the warranty of habitability to physical de-
fects on the premises.'3 In so doing, some courts have limited their
interpretation of Kline to situations in which a high degree of se-
curity in the leased premises existing at the time that the plaintiff
entered into the lease was subsequently decreased during the
tenancy.""
1. The Development of the Implied Warranty of Habitability in
New Jersey
The New Jersey Supreme Court first recognized the implied
warranty of habitability in residential leases in Marini v. Ireland.45
In Marini, the landlord instituted a summary dispossess action for
nonpayment of rent. The tenant had paid a plumber to repair a
leaking toilet and had deducted the cost of the repair from her
rent. She alleged that she repeatedly had attempted to inform her
landlord about the problem without success. The trial court held
that the landlord had no duty to make repairs and entered a de-
fault judgment for the rent in question.4e
The supreme court reversed, noting the change to viewing
leases as contracts rather than conveyances and emphasizing that
the purpose of a residential lease is to furnish the tenant with hab-
itable living quarters. 7 Based on this reality, the court held that in
residential leases there is an implied covenant of "habitability and
'1 Id. at 483 (submission of control to innkeeper).
42 Id. at 484 (landlord in better position to protect).
3 The New Jersey Supreme Court is the only state court of last resort to adopt the
reasoning of Kline thus far. See Trentacost, 82 N.J. at 231-32, 412 A.2d at 445. Some lower
courts have adopted its reasoning. See, e.g., Villalobos v. University of Oregon, 47 Or. App.
103, 107-08, 614 P.2d 107, 108-09 (1980) (court applied contractual standard of implied war-
ranty of habitability in case brought on behalf of student murdered in university
dormitory).
" See, e.g., Trice v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 14 Il1. App. 3d 97, 100, 302 N.E.2d 207, 209
(1973) (confining Kline to its specific facts); Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155, 159,
207 S.E.2d 841, 845 (1974) (security measures not decreased; therefore Kline inapplicable).
45 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
48 Id. at 135, 265 A.2d at 528.
'4 Id. at 144, 265 A.2d at 534.
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livability fitness ... that at the inception of the lease, there are no
latent defects in facilities vital to the use of the premises ... [and]
that these facilities will remain in usable condition during the en-
tire term of the lease. '48
The New Jersey Supreme Court shed some more light on the
scope of the implied warranty of habitability in Berzito v. Gam-
bino.49 In Berzito, the tenant initiated an action to recover the dif-
ference between the rent she had paid to her landlord and the
value of the apartment, given its poor condition. The supreme
court, stating that the covenant to pay rent and the covenant to
maintain the premises in a habitable condition are mutually de-
pendent, discussed the type of defect that should be deemed a
breach of the covenant of habitability.50 The court listed eight fac-
tors to guide courts in making this determination. These factors
include: a violation of any applicable housing code or building or
sanitary regulations; the nature of the deficiency or the defect's ef-
fect upon a vital facility; the potential or actual effect upon safety
and sanitation; its duration; the age of the structure; the amount of
the rent; the existence of any waiver by the tenant; and the extent
of the tenant's responsibility, if any, for the defective condition.5
In Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments,52 the New Jersey Appellate
Division refused to expand the warranty of habitability beyond the
context of the summary dispossess proceeding.53 In Dwyer, the ten-
ant, who had lived in the leased multiple-family garden apartment
development for fifteen years, suffered burns when scalding water
gushed out from a corroded bathtub faucet. Because the corroded
portion of the faucet was concealed behind a wall, the tenant had
been unaware of the defect and was, therefore, unable to complain
about it to her landlord. The trial court ruled that the implied
warranty of habitability rendered the landlord strictly liable for
the plaintiff's injuries despite the absence of actual or constructive
notice of the defect.5 4 The appellate division reversed, finding no
authority for this expansion of the implied warranty of habitability
and commented that the application of strict liability to the land-
48 Id.
63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973).
0 Id. at 469-70, 308 A.2d at 21-22.
1 Id. at 470, 308 A.2d at 22.
2 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463, afl'd, 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973).
"' Id. at 55, 301 A.2d at 466.
" Id. at 51, 301 A.2d at 464.
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lord-tenant relationship was inappropriate. 5
In Braitman v. Overlook Terrace,56 the New Jersey Supreme
Court predicted that the narrow view of the warranty of habitabil-
ity adopted in Dwyer would soon be reconsidered.57 In Braitman,
several tenants sued for losses incurred when their apartment was
burglarized. The trial court entered a judgment for the plaintiffs,
finding "that the dead lock was inoperative, the remaining slip lock
did not afford reasonable security, [the landlord] had adequate
knowledge of the defect and sufficient time to remedy it,... and
that the robbery was a foreseeable consequence of [this] condi-
tion. '58 The supreme court affirmed on traditional negligence prin-
ciples, holding that a residential tenant can recover damages from
her landlord upon proper proof that the latter unreasonably en-
hanced the risk of loss by failing to supply adequate locks after
suitable notice.5
In a separate opinion, in which Chief Justice Hughes and Jus-
tice Sullivan concurred, Justice Pashman suggested that it would
be appropriate to impose upon landlords the contractual duty of
taking reasonable precautions to safeguard their buildings from
crime. 0 He added that it was not then necessary to decide whether
the duty would be based on the landlord's superior position to
safeguard her premises or on the implied warranty of habit-
ability.61
In Trentacost, Justice Pashman, writing for the New Jersey
Supreme Court, adopted the position foreshadowed in the separate
opinion in Braitman.62 In Trentacost, a sixty-one-year-old woman
sued her landlord, seeking damages for injuries sustained when she
was assaulted and robbed in the common stairway of her apart-
ment building. The victim alleged that the landlord's failure to in-
stall a lock on the front door was both negligent and a breach of
85 Id. at 56, 301 A.2d at 467.
6 68 N.J. 368, 346 A.2d 76 (1975).
:7 Id. at 388 n.16, 346 A.2d at 87 n.16.
' Id. at 379, 346 A.2d at 78.
59 Id. at 383, 346 A.2d at 84.
60 Id. at 387, 346 A.2d at 86-87.
61 Id. at 388, 346 A.2d at 87. The majority distinguished this case from its decision in
Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962), in which the court
held that a landlord does not owe tenants or visitors the duty of providing security to pro-
tect against assaults, by emphasizing that Goldberg did recognize the liability of a landlord
for theft of his tenants' property. Id. at 588, 186 A.2d at 296.
62 Trentacost, 82 N.J. at 221-22, 412 A.2d at 440.
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the implied warranty of habitability.63 Although the court agreed
that the trial record presented sufficient evidence to establish that
the landlord should have foreseen the attack and taken reasonable
measures to prevent it, the court did not affirm the decision solely
on traditional negligence principles. Instead, noting the need for
clarification in this area, the court held that the landlord was liable
for the tenant's injuries under the theory of breach of the implied
warranty of habitability, as well as under traditional negligence
principles.6 4
In expanding the implied warranty of habitability to include
security, the Trentacost court stated: "Unfortunately, crime
against person and property is an inescapable fact of modern
life. . . .Tenants universally expect some effective means of ex-
cluding intruders from multiple dwellings. . . .Under modern liv-
ing conditions, an apartment is clearly not habitable unless it pro-
vides a reasonable measure of security from the risk of criminal
intrusion. 6 5 Furthermore, the court explicitly stated that to prove
a breach of the implied warranty of habitability a tenant need not
prove notice of a defective or unsafe condition; it is sufficient to
show that the landlord did not take reasonable measures for main-
taining a habitable residence.66
2. The Development of the Implied Warranty of Habitability in
California
In Green v. Superior Court,67 the California Supreme Court
first recognized the implied warranty of habitability in residential
leases.6 " In Green, the tenant claimed that there were approxi-
mately eighty housing code violations in his apartment building.
As a result, the tenant refused to pay rent and raised the implied
warranty of habitability as a defense to an unlawful detainer ac-
6' Id. at 219, 412 A.2d at 439.
6, Id. at 228, 412 A.2d at 443.
6' Id. at 227, 412 A.2d at 443.
66 Id. at 228, 412 A.2d at 443. The majority in Trentacost cited Goldberg for the pro-
position that liability for actions of a criminal, which are beyond the landlord's control, will
not be precluded if a reasonable person could have foreseen the danger from previous crimi-
nal activity. Id. at 223, 412 A.2d at 441. In his dissent, Justice Clifford pointed out that
Goldberg looked beyond the issue of foreseeability to "a fair balancing of the relative inter-
ests of the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution."
Id. at 235, 412 A.2d at 447 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
67 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
68 Id. at 616, 517 P.2d at 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
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tion, but the lower courts refused to consider the defense."9 The
California Supreme Court reversed and remanded, ruling that the
breach of the implied warranty of habitability is a valid defense in
an action for unlawful detainer.
Like the Marini court, Green based its holding on the realities
of the modern landlord-tenant relationship. It noted that the mod-
ern tenant, unlike the traditional agrarian lessee of the middle
ages, enters a lease not for the land surrounding the dwelling but
for the dwelling itself.7 1 In addition, the court pointed out that
modern dwellings are much more complex than those in existence
when the traditional common-law rule of caveat emptor developed,
and that landlords who have had experience with their buildings
are in a better position to discover and repair defects on the prem-
ises.7 2 Consequently, the court held that it was reasonable to imply
into a lease the tenant's expectation that the premises are and will
remain in a habitable condition.7
The Green court relied on the New Jersey court decision in
Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 4 as a "good indication" of the
general scope of the warranty of habitability. 5 The court noted the
distinction set forth in Spires between the "necessities," without
which one cannot be expected to live in a multi-storied apartment
building (such as heat, hot water, garbage disposal or elevator ser-
vice), and the "amenities" (such as lack of water leaks, lack of wall
cracks, and adequate painting).76 According to Spires, failure to
supply the former is a breach of the warranty of habitability while
failure to supply the latter is not.7 7
The California Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue
of whether the implied warranty of habitability encompasses secur-
ity. However, one appellate division case, Kwaitkowski v. Superior
Trading Co.,7 8 held that the warranty of habitability implicitly
warrants a secure environment. 9 In Kwaitkowski, the plaintiff was
9 Id. at 621, 517 P.2d at 1171, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
70 Id. at 631, 517 P.2d at 1178, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
71 Id. at 623, 517 P.2d at 1172, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
72 Id. at 624, 517 P.2d at 1173, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
71 Id. at 629, 517 P.2d at 1176, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
74 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970).
71 Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 637 n.22, 517 P.2d at 1182 n.22, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 718 n.22.
76 Id.
77 Academy Spires, 111 N.J. Super. at 482-83, 268 A.2d at 559.
78 123 Cal. App. 3d 324, 176 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1981).
70 Id. at 333, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
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raped, assaulted, and robbed in the dimly lit lobby of a building
located in a high crime area; the building's front door lock was
defective. The landlords had notice of a previous assault and rob-
bery of another tenant in a common hallway. In addition, the
plaintiff had notified one of the landlords one month before the
attack that nonresidents were entering the building and loitering
in the lobby.s0 The appellate division concluded that the landlords'
knowledge and failure to repair the lock affirmatively had placed
the plaintiff in danger of injury of the same general type as those
sustained by the other tenant in the previous attack; the landlords,
therefore, owed the plaintiff a duty based on the special relation-
ship between a landlord and her tenants, the foreseeability of the
criminal attack, and the warranty of habitability.'
A more recent appellate division decision, Penner v. Falk,8 2
however, specifically rejected the view of the Kwaitkowski court.
In Penner, the plaintiff had been assaulted by two intruders in the
common hallway of the leased premises. The plaintiff alleged that
the defendant had not provided adequate security, despite notice
of its necessity, and that this failure was the proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injuries and, therefore, a breach of the warranty of
habitability.8 In upholding the lower court's dismissal of the
action, the Penner court noted that "Kwaitkowski [was] not au-
thority for the existence of a cause of action for breach of implied
warranty of habitability owing to failings in security of the leased
premises. '8 4 Kwaitkowski, thus, did not contain any discussion of
the parameters of the warranty of habitability or of the breach
of the warranty. 5 The Penner-Kwaitkowski conflict remains
unresolved. 8
B. The Development of Strict Liability
In response to the complexities of our modern industrial soci-
ety, strict liability has emerged as a major basis of liability in the
8o Id. at 326, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
81 Id. at 333, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
82 153 Cal. App. 3d 858, 200 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1984).
83 Id. at 863-64, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
"' Id. at 868, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
85 Id.
Be Cf. Secretary of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Layfield, 88 Cal. App. 3d 28, 30, 152 Cal.
Rptr. 342, 343 (1978) (trial court erred by declining to receive into evidence handbook is-
sued by landlord containing assurances on security of premises).
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twentieth century. 7 First, courts held that a manufacturer is
strictly liable for the physical harm proximately caused by its new
products shown to have been defective and unreasonably danger-
ous when sold.88 This rule was soon extended to all commercial
sellers in the chain of distribution." Further extensions occurred
when courts held that strict liability encompassed commercial
product lessors.90
Gradually, courts began to apply the doctrine of strict liability
to the area of real estate.9' The major impediment to the inclusion
of real estate under the strict liability umbrella was the notion that
the term "product" did not apply readily to real property.92 Addi-
tionally, courts assumed that purchasers of real property were as
able to inspect for defects as the sellers. 93 However, with the intro-
duction of mass-production techniques in the housing industry fol-
lowing World War II, courts came to realize that individual pur-
chasers were typically in no better position to inspect for defects in
houses than for defects in other products.14 Therefore, strict liabil-
ity is frequently applied today to commercial sellers of new
housing.9 '
8'7 See, e.g., Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1100-03 (1960) (discussing development of strict liability in twentieth
century); Note, Products Liability at the Threshold of the Landlord Lessor, 21 HASTINGS
L.J. 458, 460-66 (1970) (same).
88 See, e.g., Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 65, 544 P.2d 983, 988 (1975)
(inadequate warning renders product "defective"); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278
Minn. 322, 333, 154 N.W.2d 488, 496 (1967) (inadequate warning); Kohler v. Ford Motor
Co., 187 Neb. 428, 436, 191 N.W.2d 601, 606 (1971) (effort of manufacturer to limit its liabil-
ity by rules applying to warranties ineffective).
88 See, e.g., Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 50-52, 46 Cal. Rptr.
552, 556-59 (1965) (wholesaler); Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Serv., Inc., 262 A.2d 807, 809-10
(D.C. 1970) (retailer and wholesaler); Walker v. Decora, Inc., 225 Tenn. 504, 514-15, 471
S.W.2d 778, 782-83 (1971) (distributor).
18 See Note, supra note 87, at 464-66; see, e.g., Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing &
Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 454, 212 A.2d 769, 778-79 (1965) (lessor of truck held to strict
liability in tort).
8 See Note, supra note 87, at 470-73.
92 Henderson, Extending the Boundaries of Strict Products Liability: Implications of
the Theory of the Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1036, 1045 (1980).
93 Id.
, Id. at 1045-46.
See, e.g., Comment, The Expanding Scope of Liability in the Home Construction
Enterprise, 5 LAND & WATER L. REV. 637, 645-49 (1970) (discussion of strict liability as
possible remedy for home buyers); Note, Builder-Vendor Liability for Construction Defects
in Houses, 55 MARQ. L. REv. 369, 375-78 (1972) (discussing strict liability as it applies to
sellers of new homes).
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1. The Development of Strict Liability in New Jersey
The New Jersey Supreme Court first held manufacturers
strictly liable in tort in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc." In
Henningsen, the plaintiff was injured while driving a vehicle man-
ufactured by the Chrysler Corporation, when it went out of control
and crashed into a wall. The plaintiff sued Chrysler for negligence
and breach of express and implied warranties. The court refused
to uphold the traditional notion that the lack of privity between
the manufacturer and the plaintiff prevented recovery. Instead, it
ruled that under modern marketing conditions, when a manufac-
turer places a new automobile into the stream of commerce and
promotes its purchase by the public, an implied warranty that the
automobile is suitable for its intended use accompanies it.9B In ad-
dition, the court ruled that Chrysler's attempted disclaimer of the
implied warranty of merchantability was invalid, noting that war-
ranties originated in the law to safeguard the buyer and not to
limit the liability of the seller or manufacturer as a matter of pub-
lic policy. 9
The court expanded the scope of strict liability to include les-
sors of automobiles in Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental
Service.' In Cintrone, the plaintiff was injured while he was a
passenger in a truck leased by his employer from the defendant. 10'
In reversing the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's breach of
warranty claim, the supreme court held that the leasing agreement
gave rise to a continuing implied warranty that the leased truck
would be fit for its anticipated use for the duration of the lease and
that the bailor was strictly liable for the breach of this warranty. °2
In reaching this determination, the court relied on traditional
rationales for adopting strict liability. It noted that a bailor in the
business of renting vehicles puts them into the stream of com-
merce in a fashion not unlike a manufacturer or retailer. 0 3 Indeed,
the court pointed out that "[t]he very nature of the business [was]
such that the bailee, his employees, passengers and the ... public
9 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
Id. at 365, 161 A.2d at 73.
Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84.
" Id. at 405-08, 161 A.2d at 95-97.
... 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
101 Id. at 438, 212 A.2d at 771.
102 Id. at 452, 212 A.2d at 778-79.
102 Id. at 450, 212 A.2d at 777.
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are exposed to a greater quantum of potential danger of harm from
defective vehicles than usually arises out of sales by the manufac-
turer.' 10 4 In addition, the court stressed that the operator of a
rental business should be strictly liable because of her degree of
expertise and because she is in the best position to detect or antici-
pate flaws or defects in the leased product.10 5 The court further
stated that if defects are not discoverable by ordinary inspection,
the operator of the rental business should bear responsibility for
the harm caused because she put the items into the stream of com-
merce.108 Finally, the court explained that it is reasonable to have
the warranty continue throughout the leasing period because it
serves the public interest and the cost can be treated as an inci-
dent of the business enterprise.1 07
The New Jersey Supreme Court expanded the application of
strict liability to the area of real estate in Schipper v. Levitt &
Sons, Inc.10 8 In Schipper, the plaintiff was burned by excessively
hot water from the faucet of the bathroom sink of a home devel-
oped by the defendant. 09 In reversing the trial court's dismissal of
the proceeding, the supreme court relied on the reasoning of Hen-
ningsen to hold that there are no meaningful distinctions between
the mass production and sale of automobiles and that of homes
because the overriding policy considerations are the same.110 The
court recognized the significance of this change in the law: "Law as
an instrument for justice has infinite capacity for growth to meet
changing needs and mores,""' and "distinctions which make no
sense in today's society . . . should be readily rejected. 1" 2
To date, the New Jersey Supreme Court has not applied the
doctrine of strict liability in tort in the landlord-tenant context.
Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments,"3 which rejected the notion of ap-
plying strict liability in tort to landlords,1 4 still prevails on this
14 Id. (emphasis in original).
... Id. at 450-51, 212 A.2d at 778.
... Id. at 451, 212 A.2d at 778.
107 Id.
1-8 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
10. Id. at 74, 207 A.2d at 316.
110 Id. at 90, 207 A.2d at 325.
. Id. at 89, 207 A.2d at 324.
112 Id. at 90, 207 A.2d at 325.
1 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463, aff'd, 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973).
114 Id. at 55, 301 A.2d at 467.
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issue.115
2. The Development of Strict Liability in California
The California Supreme Court followed a pattern of strict lia-
bility similar to that in New Jersey. First, the court recognized the
strict liability of product manufacturers in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc."6 In Greenman, the plaintiff was injured
when a piece of wood flew out of a lathe and struck him on the
forehead. 117 The plaintiff sued the retailer and the manufacturer of
the lathe for negligence and breach of express and implied warran-
ties. The manufacturer contended that the plaintiff's action for
breach of warranty was barred by section 1769 of the Civil Code
because the plaintiff did not give notice of the breach of the ex-
press warranty within a reasonable time."1 8 The court held that it
was not necessary for the plaintiff to establish an express warranty
because a manufacturer is held strictly liable in tort when it places
an article on the market with an injury-causing defect, knowing
that use will occur without inspection.1 9 In adopting strict liabil-
ity, the court stated that "[tihe purpose of such liability is to in-
sure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are
borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market
rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves."' 20
The California Supreme Court expanded strict liability to ap-
ply to retailers in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co."2 In Vander-
mark, the court noted that "[r]etailers like manufacturers are en-
gaged in the business of distributing goods to the public ... [and
are therefore] an integral part of the overall produc[tion] and mar-
keting . [system] that should bear the cost of injuries resulting
n1 It is ironic that the New Jersey Supreme Court has not addressed this issue given
that in Trentacost, it specifically identified the confusion that has occurred since Braitman
and its desire to provide guidance in the realm of landlord-tenant liability. Although the
court referred in this regard to a Note in the Rutgers Law Review, see Note, The 1975-1976
New Jersey Supreme Court Term, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 492, 696-702 (1977), which concen-
trates on the need for clarification of the law surrounding liability for security, it ignored the
fact that the Note refers to confusion regarding liability for physical defects as well. See
Trentacost, 82 N.J. at 224, 412 A.2d at 441.
59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
17 Id. at 59, 377 P.2d at 898, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
18 Id. at 60, 377 P.2d at 899, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
119 Id. at 61, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
120 Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
121 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
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from defective products." '122 It further noted that "[i]n some cases
the retailer may be the only member of that enterprise reasonably
available to the injured plaintiff. '123 It concluded that "[imposing]
[s]trict liability on the manufacturer and retailer alike affords
maximum protection to the injured plaintiff nd works no injustice
to the defendants,... [because] they can adjust the costs of such
protection between them in the course of their continuing business
relationship. "124
The court continued to expand the scope of strict liability by
applying the principle to lessors of personal property in Price v.
Shell Oil Co.125 In Price, the plaintiff, an aircraft mechanic em-
ployed by Flying Tiger, was injured while climbing a movable lad-
der mounted on a gasoline truck leased by his employer from
Shell.126 The court held Shell strictly liable for the plaintiff's inju-
ries, finding that "the paramount policy to be promoted by [strict
liability] . . . is the protection of otherwise defenseless victims of
manufacturing defects and the spreading throughout society of the
cost of compensating them.1 27 It found no difference in this regard
between sellers and non-sellers of property, because, in each in-
stance, the seller or non-seller places the article in the stream of
commerce knowing that it is to be used without inspection for
defects.1 21
The Supreme Court of California affirmed the application of
the theory of strict liability to the sale of newly constructed real
property in Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Development Co.129 In Pol-
lard, the court noted that, historically, the laws governing the sale
of real property have developed along different lines than those
governing commercial goods.130 However, the court pointed out
that the traditional application of the doctrine of caveat emptor
was no longer appropriate and that many of the principles gov-
erning chattel transactions have been adopted in the law of real
property.1 31 Accordingly, the court held that builders and sellers of
122 Id. at 262, 391 P.2d at 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 262-63, 391 P.2d at 172, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
125 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970).
126 Id. at 248, 466 P.2d at 723, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
127 Id. at 251, 466 P.2d at 725-26, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 181-82.
12 Id. at 251, 466 P.2d at 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
129 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974).
30 Id. at 377, 525 P.2d at 90, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
131 Id. at 377-78, 525 P.2d at 90, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
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newly constructed homes should be held to what is impliedly rep-
resented-that the completed structure was designed and con-
structed in a workmanlike manner.13 2
Although each of the above cases dealt with a latent defect, in
Luque v. McLean' the court clarified that the doctrine of strict
liability is equally applicable to products with patent defects.' It
noted that although the great majority of decisions dealing with
products liability have involved latent defects, there was no indica-
tion that the latent-patent distinction was sound.13 5 To the con-
trary, the court noted that any question in this regard had been
resolved' in Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co.23 7 In upholding its deci-
sion in Pike, the court noted that the policies underlying strict lia-
bility compel the conclusion that recovery should not be limited to
cases involving latent defects, as the "purpose of such liability is to
insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products
are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the
market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to
protect themselves."'' 38 If it were to require that defects be latent
in order for plaintiffs to recover, there would be few cases in which
the financial burden would be shifted to the manufacturer. 39
Moreover, the court pointed out the anomaly that would result
from holding manufacturers strictly liable for latent defects, while
allowing them to escape liability for patent defects. 40
In Becker v. IRM Corp.,' the California Supreme Court ap-
plied the rationale of its earlier strict liability cases to the land-
lord-tenant context.'42 In Becker, the plaintiff slipped and fell
132 Id. at 380, 525 P.2d at 91, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
3 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
13, Id. at 145, 501 P.2d at 1169, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 449 ("policy underlying the doctrine of
strict liability compels the conclusion that recovery should not be limited to cases involving
latent defects").
13- Id. at 144, 501 P.2d at 1169, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
336 Id.
-37 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970).
138 Luque, 8 Cal. 3d at 145, 501 P.2d at 1169, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 449 (quoting Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701
(1963)).
:39 Id.
140 Id. The court noted that "[tihe result would be to immunize from strict liability
manufacturers who callously ignore patent dangers in their products while subjecting to
such liability those who innocently market products with latent defects." Id.
141 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985).
142 Id. at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
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against a frosted shower door made of untempered glass.14" The
door broke and severely lacerated his arm.144 It was "undisputed
that the risk of serious injury would have been substantially re-
duced if the shower door had been made of tempered glass .... ,,145
The plaintiff alleged causes of action in strict liability and negli-
gence. The supreme court reversed the trial court's entry of sum-
mary judgment for the defendant as to each cause of action, and
held that landlords engaged in the business of leasing could be
held strictly liable in tort for injuries resulting from latent defects
existing at the inception of the lease.146
Writing for the majority, Judge Broussard noted that Califor-
nia follows a stream of commerce approach to strict liability in tort
and extends liability to all those who are part of the "overall pro-
ducing and marketing enterprise that should bear the cost of inju-
ries from defective products.' 147 He further noted that the doctrine
of strict liability in tort has been applied not only to manufactur-
ers, but to various other links in the commercial marketing chain,
and where appropriate, to those engaged in the real estate busi-
ness.148 After reviewing the change in landlord-tenant law evinced
in looking upon the modern lease as a contract rather than a con-
veyance, Judge Broussard reasoned that it was proper to extend
strict liability to landlords, since they impliedly represent that the
premises are fit for habitation. 149
II. APPLYING STRICT LIABILITY CONSISTENTLY
As the case law described above demonstrates, there is no le-
gitimate reason for continuing to distinguish physical defects from
defects in security for the purpose of analyzing landlord liability.
Indeed, the distinction between these two kinds of defects has
caused unnecessary confusion and inconsistency in current land-
lord-tenant law. Such troublesome complications would largely be
eliminated by the judicial recognition that any distinction between
security defects and physical defects is outmoded and by the sub-
Id. at 457, 698 P.2d at 117, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
147 Id. at 459, 698 P.2d at 119, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 216 (quoting Vandermark v. Ford
Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262, 391 P.2d 168, 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899 (1964)).
118 Id. at 460, 698 P.2d at 119, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
14D Id. at 460-61, 698 P.2d at 119-20, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
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sequent development of a coherent analytical framework applica-
ble to any defect in leased premises.
The confusion caused by these inconsistencies in landlord-ten-
ant law is evident in the New Jersey courts' analyses of the scope
of the implied warranty of habitability doctrine. As discussed
above, while Dwyer dealt with a corroded faucet, both Braitman
and Trentacost dealt with defects in security; yet the analysis per-
taining to liability was the same. The discussion in all three cases
centered not on the kind of defect involved, but on the underlying
reasons for establishing liability.
In Dwyer, the court analyzed the history of implied warranty
in New Jersey and concluded that it would not overturn existing
principles of law applicable to tort actions for personal injuries
brought by tenants against their landlords. In addition, the court
looked at the principles underlying strict liability in other contexts
and concluded that they were not relevant to the landlord-tenant
context. Thus, based on factors irrelevant to whether the defect
was physical or related to security, the Dwyer court chose not to
hold landlords strictly liable.
Similarly, Justice Pashman, in his majority opinion in
Braitman, made clear that the developing principles governing
building security were also applicable to physical defects. Indeed,
Justice Pashman stated that if the implied warranty were found
flexible enough to encompass security, "the latter theory as a
source of the landlord's duty to safeguard his tenant from crime in
his building would, of course, require a reconsideration of the
court's conclusion in Dwyer."'150
Again, in Trentacost, the court indicated that its ruling ex-
panding the scope of the implied warranty of habitability was not
limited to considerations pertaining solely to security, but rather
that it should be extended to all aspects of the modern tenancy.
Justice Pashman explained:
When engaged in the business of providing shelter, present day
landlords do not furnish merely four walls, a floor and a ceiling.
They have come to supply, and tenants now expect, the physical
requisites of a home. An apartment today consists of a variety of
goods and services. At a minimum, the necessities of a habitable
residence include sufficient heat and ventilation, adequate light,
150 Braitman, 68 N.J. at 388 n.16, 346 A.2d at 87 n.16.
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plumbing and sanitation and proper security and maintenance. 151
Thus, according to Justice Pashman, tenants are entitled to the
same protection from defects in security as from physical defects.
Although Trentacost established that strict liability is based
solely on the implied warranty of habitability, the considerations
underlying the decision are certainly appropriate to a holding of
strict liability in tort as well. The New Jersey Supreme Court's
failure in Trentacost to overturn Dwyer directly and to repudiate
the dictum in Dwyer regarding the inappropriateness of strict lia-
bility in the landlord-tenant setting has created confusion. More
importantly, it has provided support to those jurists who believe
that strict liability is inappropriate in the landlord-tenant context.
For example, in his dissent in Becker, Judge Lucas cited Dwyer as
support for his argument that the California Supreme Court erred
in holding landlords strictly liable for injuries proximately caused
by latent physical defects in the leased premises at the inception of
the tenancy.152
The California courts also have vacillated between relying
upon the implied warranty of habitability and upon strict liability
in tort when providing relief to tenants injured by a physical defect
in the leased premises. In his discussion of strict liability in tort in
Becker, for example, Judge Broussard noted the observation in
Green that the modern urban tenant is in the same position as any
other consumer of goods, and that a tenant may therefore reasona-
bly expect that the product purchased is fit as a living unit.153 He
further reasoned that, as Green indicated, a tenant purchasing
housing for a limited period of time is in no position to inspect for
latent defects in a complex modern apartment building or to bear
the expense of repair; the landlord is in a much better position to
inspect for and repair latent defects. 5 Thus, Judge Broussard ex-
panded strict liability in tort to landlords largely on the same no-
tions which had supported the expansion of the implied warranty
of habitability.
Ironically, however, by failing to maintain the concept of the
Trentacost, 82 N.J. at 225, 412 A.2d at 442.
12 Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 479, 698 P.2d at 138, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 235 (Lucas, J., dissent-
ing); see also Williams v. Gorman, 214 N.J. Super. 517, 521-23, 520 A.2d 761, 763-65 (App.
Div. 1986) (construing Trentacost as emphasizing negligence and foreseeability aspects of
Braitman), cert. denied, 107 N.J. 111, 526 A.2d 182 (1987).
153 Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 462, 698 P.2d at 121, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
154 Id.
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implied warranty of habitability separate from that of strict liabil-
ity in tort, the California Supreme Court provided tenants with
less, rather than more, protection. Thus, whereas Green held that a
landlord warrants habitable premises for the term of the lease,
Becker held only that a landlord is strictly liable for defects occur-
ring at the inception of the lease. Moreover, whereas Green specifi-
cally included patent defects in the warranty of habitability,
Becker limited strict liability in tort to latent defects.
The inconsistencies described above are not limited to the
states of New Jersey and California. In Louisiana, for example, a
jurisdiction which has imposed strict liability for physical defects
by statute since the early 1800's, 15 5 a tenant must prove negligence
in order to recover for injuries resulting from an intruder's at-
tack.156 In direct contrast, in the District of Columbia, a landlord
may be held strictly liable for breach of the implied warranty of
habitability for a defect in security, 157 but the plaintiff must prove
negligence to recover for defects in security.158
It is time to reconcile these inconsistencies and to establish
one standard of liability for both physical and security defects. Al-
though many courts have applied a negligence standard to both
types of defects, no court, to date, has applied strict liability to
both. The realities of modern tenancy, which have prompted the
move toward the establishment of strict liability for landlords,
should be given further recognition. They compel the acceptance of
strict liability, both in tort and for the breach of the implied war-
ranty of habitability, for all injuries that are caused by any defect,
latent or patent, at any time during the term of the lease.
A widely accepted view is that strict liability is not absolute
liability.'59 In strict liability, the plaintiff must establish a defect
"' See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2695 (West Supp. 1990). The Louisiana Civil Code pro-
vides that the owner of a building is answerable for the damage occasioned by its ruin when
this is caused by neglect to repair it, or when it is the result of a vice in its original construc-
tion. Id.
"' See, e.g., Gant v. Flint-Goodridge Hosp. of DUllard Univ., 359 So. 2d 279, 282-83 (La.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 362 So.2d 581 (1978). Under Louisiana law, in order for a plaintiff to
recover from a landlord for injuries sustained due to failure to provide adequate security,
the plaintiff first must prove that the landlord promised such security, and second, that he
was negligent in his failure to provide such security. Id.
117 See Kline, 439 F.2d at 485.
188 See Gladden v. Walker & Dunlop, 168 F.2d 321, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
's' See Chernobyl: Law and Communication Transboundary Nuclear Air Pollu-
tion-The Legal Material (Book Review), 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 809, 811 (1990). Strict liability
is a prima facie responsibility which permits the possibility of various defenses or qualifica-
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that proximately caused her injury.160 In proving that a defect ex-
ists, the plaintiff must establish that an unreasonably dangerous
condition existed.161 In addition, the landlord may be able to assert
the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.
16 2
The public policy supporting strict liability in the landlord-
tenant context is compelling. As noted earlier, modern tenants,
many in multi-story apartment buildings, are often not in the posi-
tion to take the steps needed to prevent or correct a defect in the
leased premises that might cause them harm. A tenant in an apart-
ment building does not have the control over the common areas or
the resources and expertise to assure that such areas are reasona-
bly safe. Nor is a tenant in the position to check that the wiring
and heating facilities in the building are safe. The modern tenant
must rely on her landlord to carry out these responsibilities.
This reliance is best protected through the application of strict
liability in landlord-tenant law. Although some commentators have
questioned whether plaintiffs have fared better under a theory of
strict liability,163 others have suggested that the theory enables
plaintiffs to prove liability more easily. 164 Moreover, there are
many secondary benefits to raising the degree of liability imposed
on landlords. As Professor Zacharias has indicated, the federal and
state governments have been slow to respond innovatively to the
increase in crime, and public expenditures have not kept pace with
its incidence.6 ' If liability were imposed on commercial enter-
prises, including landlords, the public's attention would focus on
tions, whereas absolute liability is that for which there can be no exculpation. Id.
10 See, e.g., Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700 ("manu-
facturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is
to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a
human being").
', See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment g (1945). The Restatement
defines a defective condition as "unreasonably dangerous." Id. "Unreasonably dangerous" is
defined as "dangerous to an extent beyond which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it." Id. comment i.
"02 In Louisiana, for example, which imposes strict liability on landlords by statute, see
supra note 155, both of these defenses are available. See, e.g., Rau v. Sun Ins. Co. of N.Y.,
239 So. 2d 481, 483 (La. Ct. App. 1970) (plaintiff assumed risk); Joyner v. AetnaCasualty &
Sur. Co., 240 So. 2d 545, 550 (La. Ct. App. 1970) (same), modified, 259 La. 660, 251 So. 2d.
166 (1971); Anslem v. Travelers Ins. Co., 192 So. 2d 599, 600 (La. Ct. App. 1966) (plaintiff's
contributory negligence is defense).
13 See Wildman & Farrell, Strict Products Liability in California: An Ideological
Overview, 19 U.S.F. L. REv. 139, 142 (1985).
104 See Zacharias, The Politics of Torts, 95 YALE L.J. 698, 710-13 (1986).
1"I Id. at 736 (discussing processing concerns in negligent security litigation).
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this problem; if those affected by potential liability banded to-
gether, they would act as a catalyst for legislative action.166
In addition, as Professor Zacharias discusses, the more unwill-
ing courts are to hold landlords liable for failure to provide ade-
quate security, the less likely people are to think that it is morally
acceptable not to get involved in helping to prevent crime.167 Pro-
fessor Zacharias refers to empirical research which demonstrates
that establishing legal norms would encourage the protection of
potential victims for a variety of psychological reasons, and that
the breakdown of the "I don't want to get involved" syndrome
could change the public and legislative views of the need to cooper-
ate with enforcement authorities. 16 8
An assessment of the realities of the landlord-tenant relation-
ship also indicates that the landlord, as owner of the enterprise, is
in the best position to absorb the costs of maintaining the prop-
erty. The landlord can obtain insurance to protect herself from the
impact of liability l-6  and she can raise the rent to defray any
added costs encountered in keeping the premises reasonably
safe.17 0
16 Id.
167 Id. at 741.
16 Id. at 742.
169 See Browder, supra note 2. One commentator has uncovered several difficulties that
tenants would encounter in obtaining insurance. Id. at 139. First, the only available insur-
ance for tenants generally is for hospitalization and certain medical expenses and would
probably not cover all losses suffered by tenants from injuries on leased premises. Id.
Moreover,
individuals will have a relative disadvantage with respect to the availability and
reliability of the relevant information; a landlord will better understand the likeli-
hood and severity of accidents to be expected from defects in his properties, be-
cause he has the benefit of the experience of many different tenants over a longer
period of time.
Id. at 140 n.215. Finally, those tenants with the highest risk of injury tend to be those who
are least likely to procure affordable insurance. Id.
170 See, e.g., Haines, Landlords or Tenants: Who Bears the Costs of Crime?, 2 CARDozo
L. REv. 299, 351 (1980) (increase in rent need not occur if landlords are only required to
take reasonable measures); Comment, The Landlord's Emerging Responsibility for Tenant
Security, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 275, 294 (1971) (requiring landlords to take security measures
would lead to unaffordable rents for tenants of low and moderate incomes and to abandon-
ment of urban housing in case of rent control).
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III. THE APPLICABILITY OF A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR LANDLORD
LIABILITY BASED ON Trentacost AND Becker TO OTHER
JURISDICTIONS: LANDLORD LIABILITY IN NEW YORK
In 1975, the New York State Legislature enacted Real Prop-
erty Law section 235-b, which provides in pertinent part:
In every written or oral lease or rental agreement for residential
premises the landlord or lessor shall be deemed to covenant and
warrant that the premises so leased or rented and all areas used
in connection therewith in common with other tenants or resi-
dents are fit for human habitation and for the uses reasonably
intended by the parties and that the occupants of such premises
shall not be subjected to any conditions which would be danger-
ous, hazardous or detrimental to their life, health or safety.
171
A review of the case law construing section 235-b indicates
that courts have been inconsistent in determining whether the
statute provides tenants with a cause of action based on strict
liability.1 2
A. Strict Liability in the Context of Physical Defects
Shortly after the passage of section 235-b, Judge Levy was
faced with the task of interpreting the scope of landlord liability
intended by the legislature. In Kaplan v. Coulston,7 3 the plaintiffs
Max and Lena Kaplan filed a complaint against their landlord for
damages, which were allegedly caused by the landlord's negligence
when a kitchen cabinet in their apartment fell and struck Lena
Kaplan.174 The Kaplans also filed a motion to amend their com-
plaint to include a cause of action for breach of the implied war-
ranty of habitability based on strict liability. 7 5
In determining whether to grant the motion to amend the
pleading, Judge Levy analyzed whether the amended complaint
stated a cause of action; he concluded that a cause of action ex-
isted based on strict liability for breach of the implied warranty of
habitability.'76
171 N.Y. REAL PRop. LAW § 235-b (McKinney 1989).
172 See infra notes 175, 182-208 and accompanying text. In this Article, the discussion
of strict liability for landlords in New York will be limited to the interpretation of this
statute.
173 85 Misc. 2d 745, 381 N.Y.S.2d 634 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1976).
174 Id.
175 Id.
178 Id. at 751-52, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
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Judge Levy stated that although persuasive reasons militated
against allowing such a cause of action, these reasons were out-
weighed by the policy considerations underlying strict liability and
the policy trend in tort and landlord tenant law.1 7 In reviewing
these developments, he cited the New Jersey Supreme Court's de-
cision in Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and Rental Services,1 78
which held that a truck rental agency, by placing vehicles into the
stream of commerce in a fashion not unlike a manufacturer or re-
tailer, warrants that the car will not fail mechanically during the
rental period.1 79 He also noted the decision of the California Court
of Appeals in Fakhoury v. Magner,1s0 which extended strict liabil-
ity to a landlord of a furnished apartment.1 8 Finally, he noted that
in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,82 the New Jersey Supreme
Court extended the implied warranty of habitability to the sale of
realty. 83
In addition to reviewing these precedents, Judge Levy focused
on the applicability of two significant rationales underlying strict
liability to the landlord-tenant context. First, he analogized a land-
lord to a seller of a product; both have superior knowledge, are in a
better position to prevent defects, and induce the consumer or ten-
ant to rely on her representations."" Second, he discussed the ap-
plicability of the view that the seller could better bear and dis-
tribute a loss than the buyer, noting that a landlord could
purchase liability insurance and pass the cost to all of the te-
nants."l 5 Finally, he discussed how the difficulty of proving negli-
gence stemming from circumstances beyond one's control might
prevent a plaintiff from prevailing even though the plaintiff could
prove a defect and causation in the landlord-tenant context. 8
Judge Levy found this rationale appropriate because often the de-
fect involved may have been created by an affirmative act of either
the landlord or a third person, or by the failure of the landlord to
17 Id. at 749, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
1- 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
170 Id. at 450, 212 A.2d at 777-78.
"1 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972).
181 Id. at 63, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 476 (landlord held strictly liable, not as lessor of real
property, but as lessor of furniture).
44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
Id. at 90, 207 A.2d at 325.





repair a defective condition. Additionally, the tenant might be un-
able to prove that the landlord knew or should have known of the
defective condition. 8
As courts have struggled to resolve the issue of the appropriate
degree of liability under the implied warranty statute, Kaplan has
served as the basis of much discussion. Although some courts have
adopted the reasoning of Kaplan, others have declined to do so. In
Curry v. New York City Housing Authority, 88 for example, the
appellate division strongly disagreed with Kaplan. The court ac-
knowledged that the language of the warranty in section 235-b was
adapted from the law of sales, an area in which strict liability is
imposed. 8 9 However, the court noted that the legislative history of
section 235-b clearly indicates that strict liability was not in-
tended. 90 Furthermore, the court relied on Dwyer to support its
position that Kaplan was incorrectly decided. 9 '
To further support its position that section 235-b was in-
tended to codify judicial decisions which protected tenants' rights
to live in habitable conditions but was not intended to extend tort
liability, the Curry court looked to the words of the court of ap-
peals in Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell'92 -the only
court of appeals decision thus far to interpret section 235-b. In
Park West, while considering alleged breaches of the warranty of
habitability during a janitorial, strike, New York's highest court
elaborated upon the history and purpose of the statute. The court
noted:
[U]ntil development of the warranty of habitability in residential
leases, the contemporary tenant possessed few private remedies
and little real power, under either the common law or modern
housing codes, to compel his landlord to make necessary repairs
or provide essential services. Initially by judicial decision (cita-
tions omitted) and ultimately by legislative enactment in August,
1975, the obsolete doctrine of the lease as a conveyance of land
was discarded .... A residential lease is now effectively deemed a
sale of shelter and services by the landlord who impliedly war-
rants [the safety and habitability of the premises] .19
117 Id. at 750-51, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
188 77 A.D.2d 534, 430 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1st Dep't 1980).
Id. at 535, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 307.
100 Id.
1 0 Id., 430 N.Y.S.2d at 306-07.
102 47 N.Y.2d 316, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 418 N.Y.S.2d 310, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1977).
103 Id. at 325, 391 N.E.2d at 1292-93, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 314-15.
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While holding the landlord liable for alleged breaches of the
implied warranty of habitability, the court of appeals acknowl-
edged that it was not possible to document every instance in which
the warranty of habitability could be breached. However, the court
did establish some guidelines to determine whether a breach has
occurred. First, the court noted that the scope of the implied war-
ranty of habitability includes conditions caused by both latent and
patent defects existing at the inception of and throughout the ten-
ancy.19 4 Second, the court stated that, although violations of a
housing code are factors to be considered in determining whether a
breach of the warranty has arisen, code violations serve only as a
starting point in a court's analysis.'95 In addition, the court indi-
cated that there are certain violations of the warranty that are be-
yond dispute, such as insect and rodent infestation, insufficient
heating and plumbing facilities, highly dangerous electrical outlets
or wiring, and inadequate sanitation facilities or other similar
services. 19 6
Significantly, the court of appeals chose not to comment upon
the availability of remedies other than the remedy implicated by
the facts in the case at hand, which was a reduction in rent. 97
However, the court noted that because a lease is more analogous to
a purchase of shelter and services than to a conveyance of an es-
tate, the implied warranty of fitness governing the law of sales is
therefore more apt than the antiquated law of property.'9 Since
Park West, trial courts have been reluctant to follow Kaplan.'99 As
one court has implied, this reluctance may be attributable partly
to the reticence of the court of appeals in Park West to address
the issue of additional remedies under section 235-b.200
B. Strict Liability in the Context of Security
Although the court in Park West did not specifically address
the issue of whether a failure to provide security would be a breach
of section 235-b, it did emphasize that a landlord warrants that
"" Id. at 327, 391 N.E.2d at 1294, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
195 Id.
" Id. at 328, 391 N.E.2d at 1294-95, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
197 Id. at 329, 391 N.E.2d at 1295, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
"8 Id. at 324, 391 N.E.2d at 1292, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
'99 See Pezzolanella v. Galloway, 132 Misc. 2d 429, 431-32, 503 N.Y.S.2d 990, 992 (Utica
City Ct. 1986).
200 Id. at 431, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 992.
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there will be no conditions that endanger the health and safety of
her tenants.' l Thus, without any discussion, the appellate division
in Carp v. Marcus0 2 unequivocally held that, because the warranty
protects tenants from dangerous or unsafe conditions, a plaintiff
alleging a breach of the warranty in connection with an assault or
other nefarious conduct by a third party had stated a valid cause
of action.2"'
Today, however, courts clearly are limiting landlord liability
for a breach of the warranty resulting from defective security to an
action in negligence. For example, in Brownstein v. Edison,04 the
court, although noting the "burgeoning cancer of crime [that] has
made our citizens veritable hermits in their homes,"205 indicated
that tenants receive protection under the statute when a defendant
assumes the duty to provide some degree of protection to tenants
such as by the installation of front door locks.20 6
Similarly, in a recent decision, Highview Associates v.
Kofer,207 the court, in holding that a landlord violated the implied
warranty of habitability in a rural garden complex apartment by
providing no security whatsoever, did so only because the defend-
ant had been on notice of a substantial number of thefts and bur-
glaries over the years.20 8 Indeed, the court noted that prior to the
criminal activity, security measures had not been part of the im-
plied warranty.209
In narrowly interpreting section 235-b, courts have not chosen
to explore past indications that a more expansive view of landlord
liability for defective security might be appropriate. For example,
in Sherman v. Concourse,210 the appellate division, although limit-
ing its holding in that case, demonstrated its interest in the
broader holding of Kline that a landlord is under a duty to protect
tenants from foreseeable criminal acts of third parties given her
201 Park West, 47 N.Y.2d at 325, 391 N.E.2d at 1292-93, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 314-15.
202 112 A.D.2d 546, 491 N.Y.S.2d 484 (3d Dep't 1985).
203 Id., 491 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
20, 103 Misc. 2d 316, 425 N.Y.S.2d 773 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1980).
205 Id. at 318, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 775 (citing People v. Gruenberg, 67 Misc. 2d 185, 188,
324 N.Y.S.2d 372, 376 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Kings County 1971)).
206 Id. at 318, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 774-75.
207 124 Misc. 2d 797, 477 N.Y.S.2d 585 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1984).
200 Id. at 800, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
200 Id. at 799, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 586.
210 47 A.D.2d 134, 365 N.Y.S.2d 239 (2d Dep't 1975).
1990]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
special relationship to her tenants.21'
C. A New Framework for Liability
Given the confusion of the lower courts as to the proper inter-
pretation of landlord liability pursuant to section 235-b in the con-
text of physical defects and the courts' narrow interpretation of
landlord liability for breach of the implied warranty of habitability
in the context of defective security, it is clear that it is time for a
new look at the proper interpretation of section 235-b in both the
context of physical defects and defects in security. Park West, as
discussed above, does not in any way support a limited interpreta-
tion of the remedies available under section 235-b in either con-
text. Moreover, some of the dialogue as to the correct interpreta-
tion of the remedies available pursuant to section 235-b has taken
place prior to the developments in New Jersey discussed above.
For example, the appellate division in Curry relied heavily on
Dwyer, which has now been overturned implicitly by the New
Jersey Supreme Court. These developments demonstrate that the
time has come for a new unified approach to landlord liability in
both contexts, physical defects and security, in New York and in
other states as well.
CONCLUSION
In modern society, landlords, whether or not in the business of
leasing, place "a well known package of goods and services [into
the stream of commerce]-a package which includes not merely
walls and ceilings but also adequate heat, light and ventilation, ser-
viceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors, proper san-
itation and proper maintenance." '212 Landlords impliedly represent
to their tenants that this package will be fit for the purpose in-
tended. If a defect in the package arises for which the tenant is
blameless, the principles of strict liability demand that the land-
lord compensate the tenant. Courts should hold landlords strictly
liable in tort, thereby providing incentives to persons putting prod-
ucts into the stream of commerce to both make those products safe
and to fairly distribute the cost of compensating the injuries
caused by the products. Above all, courts must recognize that mod-
211 Id. at 140, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 244.
212 Davis & De La Torre, supra note 2, at 144-45.
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ern contract law mandates that the reasonable expectations of con-
sumers must be protected and that, therefore, landlords must be
held strictly liable for failures in meeting those reasonable
expectations.

